Telegrama histórico.

El amigo Raúl Taladrid me envió un histórico telegrama remitido por la Embajada de Estados Unidos en La Habana al Departamento de Estado el 2 de diciembre de 1958 .
En este documento se pone de manifiesto el apoyo de Estados Unidos a Batista y a sus seguidores, excluyendo siempre de ese apoyo a los revolucionarios (Dr. Nestor García Iturbe).

Cuba-L Analysis (Albuquerque) - History Document: Telegram from

the US Embassy in Cuba, Dec 2, 1958

[Dear reader, for the sake of historical memory, Cuba-L is initiating aseries providing significant documents that might be useful to consider. Theintent is to provide information that offer historical tools to furthercomprehend Cuban hsitory since 1959, something that is often missing.

Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State [1]

Havana, December 2,1958-6 p.m.

Today at meeting members of my consultative group from

local American community (see despatch 880, April 282) question of

US policy toward Cuba came up for discussion.

Consensus of views expressed by American business

men follows:

1. Cuban situation deteriorating very rapidly. Unless strongly supported by

US, Batista cannot last until February 24, and maybe not beyond January 1.

Even with such support, it doubtful he could hold out to end of his term.

2. Castro movement is Communist-inspired and dominated.

(Unanimous agreement but no new evidence produced; Potts said arecent 26 July Movement statement extraordinarily similar to statementissued by Arbenz government in Guatemala, where Potts was ESSO manager at the time.)

3. Triumph of Castro movement will be followed by bloodshedthat will dwarf bloody aftermath of Machado's overthrow. US, in owninterests and those of Cubans in general, who look to US for help,should not stand by silently and let this occur.

4. Since inconceivable that US assist Castro and since probablytoo late to help Batista, US should promote and give full and actualsupport including arms toa military civilian junta. Group generally feltjunta would be more likely to enlist wide popular support and wouldweaken Castro, if it ineuded some of best elements of present GOC, ofpolitical opposition, and of civic groups now supporting Castro. Batistashould have no role in government.1 Source: Department of State, Central FIles, 737.00/12-258. Secret;Priority.